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Environmental law is particularly prone to being antagonized by populi-
st politics. This assertion entails relevant theoretical and practical implica-
tions, yet it has received scarce attention from scholars and policymakers. 
This paper aims at analyzing the dynamics of  this opposition, as well as 
its manifestations in the Global South. Furthermore, against the backdrop 
of  the COVID-19 pandemic, this article explores the relationship between 
the environment and epidemiological outbreaks. Lastly, the future of  envi-
ronmental law in the post-pandemic world order is discussed, considering in 
particular the idea of  a reflux of  globalization – a phenomenon that reinforces 
nationalisms and casts a shadow on multilateralism – and how the inherent 
tension with populism should play out in this scenario. In doing so, this stu-
dy hypothesizes that a widespread health emergence could potentially chan-
ge the public’s risk perception so significantly that populist politics would 
no longer be able to eschew the environmental agenda and its public health 
implications.
Keywords: Populism. Environmental law. Environmental governance. Cli-
mate change. Public health. COVID-19 coronavirus pandemic.
Resumo
O Direito Ambiental é particularmente propenso a ser antagonizado por 
políticas populistas. Esta afirmação tem implicações teóricas e práticas rele-
vantes, que, entretanto, receberam pouca atenção por parte de estudiosos e 
de formuladores de políticas públicas. Este artigo tem por objetivo analisar a 
dinâmica desse antagonismo, bem como suas manifestações no Sul Global. 
Explora-se, além disso, a relação entre meio ambiente e emergências epi-
demiológicas no contexto da pandemia de COVID-19. Por fim, discute-se 
o futuro do Direito Ambiental na ordem mundial pós-pandemia, conside-
rando, em particular, a ideia de um refluxo da globalização – fenômeno que 
reforça nacionalismos e eclipsa o multilateralismo – e de como a inerente 
tensão com o populismo se desenvolve neste cenário. Ao fazê-lo, este estudo 
levanta a hipótese de que uma emergência generalizada de saúde teria o po-
tencial de mudar a percepção de risco do público de forma tão significativa 
que políticas populistas não mais seriam capazes de desviar-se da agenda 
ambiental e das implicações desta para a saúde pública.
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1 Introduction
This paper argues that the relationship between En-
vironmental Law and populism is inherently antagonis-
tic. Environmental law is pluralistic by design – in the 
sense that, to be effective, it needs to take into account 
the interests of  a myriad of  stakeholders –, and deri-
ves its legitimacy, as well as its ability to seek responses 
for complex environmental issues, from a set of  highly 
institutionalized practices. Populism, conversely, is an-
tipluralist; a complex phenomenon that, paradoxically, 
strives to offer simple and immediate solutions. Unear-
thing the dynamics of  this antagonism is of  extraordi-
nary relevance, both theoretical and practical.
This study begins by discussing the major charac-
teristics of  populism, and its particular features in the 
Global South. The following section unearths the inhe-
rently tense relationship between environmental law 
and populism, exploring the manifold reasons why the 
environmental agenda is often targeted by populist po-
litics. Next, it delves on the reciprocal implications of  
environmental law, climate change, public health, and 
pandemics, including the causal links between the en-
vironment and epidemiological outbreaks. Finally, this 
paper ponders the future of  environmental law and go-
vernance in a post-pandemic world order, and hypothe-
sizes that a widespread health emergence could change 
the public’s risk perception so significantly that not even 
populist politics would be able to further eschew the en-
vironmental agenda and its public health implications.
2 Populism(s) and the Global South
Populism is not a univocal concept. As a starting 
point, this article adopts the basic notion, borrowed 
from political science, that populism confronts two 
antagonistic groups, namely the (pure) people and the 
(corrupt) elite: Mudde and Kaltwasser posit that
[b]eyond the lack of  scholarly agreement on the 
defining attributes of  populism, agreement is 
general that all forms of  populism include some 
kind of  appeal to “the people” and a denunciation of  
“the elite.” Accordingly, it is not overly contentious 
to state that populism always involves a critique of  
the establishment and an adulation of  the common 
people. More concretely, we define populism as a 
thin-centered ideology that considers society to be ultimately 
separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic camps, “the 
pure people” versus “the corrupt elite,” and which argues that 
politics should be an expression of  the volonté générale 
(general will) of  the people.1
Although the manifestations of  populism may have 
distinct features in the Global North and in the South, 
it is generally understood as a phenomenon that oc-
curs all across the political spectrum, which is why it 
is perhaps more aptly named as “populisms”. Indeed, 
Mudde and Kaltwasser describe populism as “one of  
the main political buzzwords of  the 21st century. The 
term is used to describe left-wing presidents in Latin 
America, right-wing challenger parties in Europe, and 
both left-wing and right-wing presidential candidates in 
the United States”.2
Müller argues that, at its core, populism is essentially 
antipluralist: “[i]n addition to being elitist, populists are 
always antipluralist. They claim that they, and they alone, 
represent the people”.3  
What counts as “the people”, one might ask? For 
populism, the people is an abstract, homogenous, and 
virtuous ideation, represented in discourse as “the real 
people”. Populism, therefore, seeks to draw its legitima-
cy directly from the people, as if  in a distorted version 
of  direct democracy that is ultimately - and fundamen-
tally, to the extent it often degenerates into autocratic 
regimes - antidemocratic.
Populism often appeals to the “silent majority”, that 
is, to those social groups that feel overlooked in the de-
mocratic process. Mamonova defines it as 
the majority of  the ‘ordinary’, ‘simple’, ‘little’ people, 
who are the main supporters of  authoritarian 
populism. The silent majority is commonly 
portrayed as (1) consisting of  ‘irrational’, ‘politically 
short-sighted’ people, who vote against their self-
interests; (2) it is analyzed as a homogeneous group, 
without attempting to distinguish different motives 
and interests among its members.4  
1 MUDDE, Cas and KALTWASSER, Cristóbal Rovira. Populism: 
A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017, 
p. 5-6.
2 Ibid., p 1.
3 MÜLLER, Jan-Werner. What is Populism? Philadelphia: University 
of  Pennsylvania Press, 2016, p. 
4 MAMONOVA, Natalia. Understanding the silent majority in 





































































Moffitt5 argues that populism is a political style that, 
with the impulse of  new media formats, has spread glo-
bally, and that, among other features, this style encom-
passes the adoption of  “bad manners”. By behaving in 
a way that is uncharacteristic for politicians, the populist 
leaders distances themselves from the elite, and draws 
closer to the people. 
Urbinati6, citing Rosanvallon, posits that populism 
takes advantage of  the mechanisms of  “negative po-
litics”, by presenting itself  essentially as anti-establish-
ment – even after it ascends to power. Perpetuating a 
state of  crisis is a known tactic, deployed so as to allow 
populist politicians to remain on the offensive, aiming 
to preempt criticism from opposing political forces. 
Fukuyama7 states that populist movements “are 
threatening democracy from within”, by “threatening 
the constitutional checks and balances that are really 
part of  a functioning liberal democracy”. Diamond8 
coined the expression “democratic recession”, which 
he identifies with “the decline of  democratic efficacy, 
energy, and self-confidence in the West”.
Populism is often centered around the person of  
a charismatic leader, which accounts for a tendency to 
autocracy, or at least to concentration of  powers in the 
hands of  said leader. It is important, however, to note 
that this tendency is not absolute. As Mudde and Kalt-
wasser argue,
[w]hile there is a close association between 
populist leaders and strongmen, it is important 
not to conflate the two. In fact, only a minority 
of  strongmen are populists and only a minority 
of  populists is a strongman. The notion of  the 
strongman is often related to authoritarian regimes. 
Leaders like Juan Manuel de Rosas in Argentina 
(1793–1877), Porfirio Díaz in Mexico (1830–1915), 
and Francisco Franco in Spain (1892–1975) are 
common examples of  strongmen in the scholarly 
literature. All these leaders can be considered as 
absolute rulers and thus anything but democrats. But 
for Putin in rural Russia? The Journal of  Peasant Studies, Abington-on-
Thames, v. 46 n. 3, p. 564, 2019. 
5 MOFFITT, Benjamin. The global rise of  populism: performance, po-
litical style, and representation. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
2016, p. 5.
6 URBINATI, Nadia. Political Theory of  Populism. Annual Review 
of  Political Science, Palo Alto, v. 22, p. 113, 2019.
7 SKY NEWS. Populism is a threat to democracy but don’t panic, warns 
Francis Fukuyama. Available at: https://news.sky.com/story/pop-
ulism-is-a-threat-to-democracy-but-dont-panic-warns-francis-fuku-
yama-11855062. Access on: Nov. 9, 2019.
8 DIAMOND, Larry. Facing Up to the Democratic recession. Jour-
nal of  Democracy, Washington, v. 26, n. 1, p. 152, Jan. 2015.
as populism maintains an ambivalent relationship 
with democracy, the authoritarian characteristic of  
the strongman is not inherent to populism.9 
Populist leaders are also highly adaptable to what the 
people seemingly want in a certain quadrant of  history, 
a characteristic that makes populism particularly ver-
satile and powerful. Although this may, at times, entail 
some progress towards in satisfying concrete popular 
demands, self-serving manipulation of  a notion of  the 
general will may be deployed as an instrument to meet 
the desire to hold on to power:
[w]hatever its manifestation, the monist core 
of  populism, and especially its notion of  a 
“general will,” may well lead to the support of  
authoritarian tendencies. In fact, populist actors 
and constituencies often share a conception of  the 
political that is quite close to the one developed by 
the German political theorist Carl Schmitt (1888–
1985). According to Schmitt, the existence of  a 
homogeneous people is essential for the foundation 
of  a democratic order. In this sense, the general will 
is based on the unity of  the people and on a clear 
demarcation of  those who do not belong to the 
demos and, consequently, are not treated as equals. 
In short, because populism implies that the general 
will is not only transparent but also absolute, it can 
legitimize authoritarianism and illiberal attacks on 
anyone who (allegedly) threatens the homogeneity 
of  the people.10 
In the Global South, populism has peculiar roots, 
features, and incarnations. From Latin American “et-
nopopulism” to Middle Eastern “petropopulism”, po-
pulisms emerged as alternatives to the basic inability of  
the State to provide for their citizens. Disenfranchised 
and disillusioned, the people turn to anti-establishment 
populist leaders, in the hope that their basic needs will 
be met.
Populism has spread unevenly in the Global South. 
In the words of  Mudde and Kaltwasser, “Latin Ameri-
ca is the region with the most enduring and prevalent 
populist tradition.”11 This is due to a combination of  
socioeconomic inequality and a tradition of  holding pe-
riodic elections in which voters can channel their dis-
satisfaction against the establishment, often embodied 
in corrupt oligarchies. Although these democracies may 
be deeply flawed, as the declaration by the Organiza-
tion of  American States that the 2019 presidential elec-
9 DIAMOND, Larry. Facing Up to the Democratic recession. Jour-
nal of  Democracy, Washington, v. 26, n. 1, p. 152, Jan. 2015.
10 Ibid., 18.





































































tion in Bolivia was rigged, and the grasp of  power of  
Venezuela’s Chávez and Maduro, the fact that the region 
has, at least nominally, a democratic tradition, allowed 
populism to flourish in Latin America. Conversely, po-
pulism is largely absent in Africa, where many countries 
remain plainly authoritarian. Middle Eastern populism 
has become increasingly visible in countries like Israel 
and  Turkey, and it can be argued that some populist 
tendencies were at play, to some extent and uneven-
ly in the countries involved, at the 2011 Arab Spring. 
Australasia has been characterized by the rise of  ethnic 
populist manifestation, aiming to cater to the interests 
of  aboriginal and Maori populations. Finally, Southeast 
Asia saw the appearance of  populism – which took the 
form of  attacks to neoliberal policies and globalization 
– in the wake of  the 1997 Asian Tigers financial crisis.
Interestingly, the phenomenon of  populism in the 
Global South has been studied as a parameter for si-
milar manifestations that followed suit in the North. 
Wahby12 argues that the recent wave of  populist move-
ments in the North can be understood along the lines 
of  the experiences of  the South – namely the failure of  
the social contract, networks of  urban informality and 
elite privilege, and exclusionary populist movements –, 
stating that 
strong contestation against the hegemony of  the 
urban center has long emerged in the Global South, 
with the latest ‘populist’ backlash in the North 
following suit to express an anti-establishment 
sentiment (Ridley 2016). These are compounded 
by global experiences of  urban-rural inequalities, 
desolation of  industrial cities, and the exploitation 
of  state failures by nonstate actors bearing 
nationalistic and/or religious divisive discourses 
(Ben Nefissa 2009; Roy 2009). 
Populist politics, as defined in this section, contra-
dict environmental law in several manners, and the Glo-
bal South is more susceptible to some of  these manifes-
tations. The next chapter explores these dynamics.
3  Populism and Environmental Law: 
Polar Opposites?
Environmental law is, in general terms, particularly 
susceptible to being antagonized by populist politics. 
12 WAHBY, Noura. Institutions and Populism in the Global South 
- Lessons for the Brexit-Trump Era, City & Community, Hoboken, v. 
16 n. 2, p. 139, Jun. 2017.
This is a relevant assertion, yet it has received scarce 
attention from scholars and policymakers. This section 
aims at analyzing the reasons why Environmental Law 
and populism may be considered polar opposites, na-
mely:
(1) Environmental law, in the sense that it holds 
“that society is divided into a broad variety of  partly 
overlapping social groups with different ideas and inte-
rests” ,13 is highly reliant on pluralism, while populism is 
essentially antipluralist.
(2) The complex nature of  environmental problems 
requires sustained, long-term action, while populism re-
lies on delivering immediate results.
(3) Environmental law depends on sound science 
and institutions, while populism typically sees scientists 
and bureaucrats as an expert elite - “the others” - that is 
not to be trusted14.
(4) Environmental law ideally derives its legitimacy 
from the rule of  law, while populism is “impatient with 
the rule of  law”15, typically seen as in undesirable cons-
traint, limiting the leader’s powers and hindering the 
direct communication between them and their consti-
tuents. 
(5) In spite of  recent stalemates, multilateralism 
remains a main source of  environmental law, while 
populism tends to reject (with serious diplomatic con-
sequences) global institutions in favor of  a nationalis-
tic approach. In this context, the environment often 
13 On the direct opposition between pluralism and populism, 
Mudde and Kaltwasser (op.cit., p. 7-8) argue that “[w]ithin pluralism 
diversity is seen as a strength rather than a weakness. Pluralists be-
lieve that a society should have many centers of  power and that poli-
tics, through compromise and consensus, should reflect the interests 
and values of  as many different groups as possible. Thus, the main 
idea is that power is supposed to be distributed throughout society 
in order to avoid specific groups—be they men; ethnic communi-
ties; economic, intellectual, military or political cadres, etc.—acquir-
ing the capacity to impose their will upon the others.”
14 “There is then a need to analyse the demand for populist rule, 
which frequently appears as a voice for the curtailing of  environ-
mental regulation. Considering that populism depends on bureau-
cracies as culprits, to generate betrayal stories around environmental 
law, and that environmental law is overwhelmingly procedural in 
nature, this makes environmental law especially susceptible to popu-
listic pressures.” BOGOJEVIĆ, Sanja. The Erosion of  the Rule of  
Law: How Populism Threatens Environmental Protection. Journal of  
Environmental Law, Oxford, v. 31, p. 393, 2019.
15 “The populist style of  politics, ‘impatient with the rule of  law’, 
puts pressure on environmental protection. Populism is a broad 
spectrum of  political tendencies, and the way different populist re-





































































appears in populist politics as a political proxy for ques-
tions of  security and citizenship, such as the reinfor-
cement of  sovereignty over natural resources and the 
idealization of  landscape as a symbol of  national unity16.
(6) Multilevel governance of  the environment pre-
supposes a high level of  public participation and access 
to information, while populism relies on centralizing in-
formation and building official narratives.
(7) Lastly, and perhaps more importantly, environ-
mental law creates a series of  tangible constraints to 
individual activity, while populism preaches on the idea 
that the people needs to “regain control” and be free as 
possible to act as they please.
From the standpoint of  environmental governan-
ce, given the peculiarities of  its object – environmen-
tal issues are transboundary and systemic by nature –, 
success depends largely on the existence a multilevel 
institutional architecture, one that relies heavily on coo-
peration across scientific domains (including environ-
mental law), stakeholders, and global institutions.
In this sense, Fisher17 posits that 
environmental law has developed a complex 
architecture to mediate between different interests 
and to ensure that environmental decisions are as 
robust, legitimate, and fair as they can be. It is the 
ultimate legal expression of  the fact that we live 
in a pluralistic society. In being so, environmental 
law engages all the institutional and legal resources 
of  a constitutional democracy to operate - public 
16 “Very old and very dangerous links between ideas about the 
environment and ideas about governance are resurfacing in the au-
thoritarian and populist turn around the globe. Current politics of  
nativism, masculinism, white supremacy, and the hardening of  bor-
ders are deeply intertwined with ideas linking racialized, gendered, 
and national identities to specific environments, territories, and the 
alleged existential struggle for scarce resources. Likewise, metaphors 
of  the nation as an organism that can be healthy or diseased, con-
taminated or cleansed, are closely linked to particular imaginaries 
of  national environments. In a more straightforwardly economic 
register, natural resources within indigenous or otherwise contested 
territories are being claimed as assets both critical for, and rightly 
belonging to, the “nation” to be used for purposes of  national de-
velopment. Among the many problems with such frameworks, the 
intense impulse to recode ‘nature’ as ‘national’ - the national terri-
tory, national resources, national self-sufficiency in energy or food, 
and so on - tends to obscures global and transboundary connections 
and processes”. MCCARTHY, James. Authoritarianism, Populism, 
and the Environment: Comparative Experiences, Insights, and Per-
spectives, Annals of  the American Association of  Geographers, Abington-
on-Thames, v. 109, n. 2, p. 306-7, 2019.
17 FISHER, Elizabeth. Unearthing the Relationship Between En-
vironmental Law and Populism, Journal of  Environmental Law, Ox-
ford, v. 31, n. 2, p. 2, 2019.
discourse, expertise, public administration, 
legislation, accountability, dispute resolution, multi-
level governance and much else besides. 
It hasn’t always been the case. Environmental law 
has emerged from the realization that a purely utilita-
rian perspective towards natural resources was unsus-
tainable. The dissemination and popularization of  the 
environmental agenda was jumpstarted by the United 
Nations Conference on the Human Environment, held 
in 1972 in Stockholm. Environmental problems began 
to be perceived as a global issue, and the importance 
of  striking a balance between environmental protection 
and economic development, which would later evolve 
into the fundamental concept of  sustainable develop-
ment, made its way into the order of  the day.
Environmental matters are, more often than not, 
transversal to other vital questions such as health, pea-
ce and security, food safety, and international trade. As 
such, the benefits of  increased coordination extend well 
beyond the environmental arena. A good illustration 
of  this point is the scope of  Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs): they are, by design, intertwined, and en-
vironmental rights, although more explicitly connected 
to some of  the Goals, are instrumental for all SDGs 
- even those that do not expressly mention the envi-
ronment. Indeed, environmental rights provide an im-
portant focal point to ensure adequate governance, that 
is, that the framework of  environmental laws and ins-
titutions develops continuously and reaches new levels 
of  effectiveness. Ultimately, environmental rights are a 
compass that, if  duly implemented, are able to ensure 
that all development is made in a sustainable manner.
As Stockholm+50 approaches, strengthening envi-
ronmental rights at the global, regional, and national 
levels is a topic of  vital importance. UN Environment’s 
Global Report on Environmental Rule of  Law18, the 
first-ever report on the matter, emphasizes that the en-
vironmental rule of  law’s benefits for the international 
community extend well beyond the environmental do-
main, and needs to be factored in by all actors involved 
in global governance. The report’s findings are a contri-
bution towards understanding the root causes of  why, 
despite the proliferation of  environmental norms, these 
are still not fully implemented: although there are still 
gaps in international environmental law – as recognized 
18 UNITED NATIONS. UN Environment, Environmental Rule of  





































































by UNGA Resolution 72/27719 – efforts for implemen-
tation of  the extensive framework of  existing environ-
mental norms lie at the heart of  the matter. 
Indeed, almost five decades after Stockholm, there is 
sufficient accumulated experience to assess the effecti-
veness of  the efforts to incorporate the environmental 
agenda into international discussion forums. The mul-
tiplicity of  actors, locations, and themes involved in the 
environmental regime creates complexities that need to 
be constantly articulated. Local, regional, national, and 
global initiatives have been flourishing in both the pu-
blic and private sectors, and these efforts need robust 
coordination. This leads to the perception that addres-
sing international environmental issues in a casuistic, ad 
hoc, fashion is less than ideal, and that a greater degree 
of  coordination is needed. 
This pluralistic, complex, coordinated, and – becau-
se it aims to strike a delicate balance among conflicting, 
and often irreconcilable, interests of  a multitude of  
actors – intrinsically  incomplete approach is in direct 
opposition to the basic tenets of  populism: the aspi-
ration to provide simple (or, rather, simplistic), strai-
ghtforward, and immediate solutions that radiate from 
one individual (the populist leader) directly towards one 
diffuse group (the people).
There are, however, other particular, and nonethe-
less very relevant circumstances in which environmen-
tal impact of  populism is not deliberate, but something 
of  a side effect: impoverished populations of  countries 
(frequently in the Global South) under populist rule 
are, more often than not, too focused on survival to 
even consider environmental action. The same applies 
to countries depleted by military conflict or other eco-
nomic, religious, or environmental causes of  forced mi-
gration.
All this holds true in the current geopolitical con-
figuration. The world as it is known is nevertheless 
undergoing profound changes, triggered by the CO-
VID-19 coronavirus pandemic. Is it possible that the-
se changes are intense enough to force even populist 
politicians to acknowledge the environmental agenda? 
Or, to the contrary, will the environment be relegated 
to an afterthought in a world struggling for economic 
recovery? To address these questions, it is necessary to 
19 UNITED NATIONS. United Nations General Assembly, Resolu-
tion A/RES/72/277, 2018.
explore, first, the reciprocal implications between the 
environment and epidemiological outbreaks. 
4  Environmental Law, Climate 
Change, and Public Health: 
Reciprocal Implications and Takeaways 
from the COVID-19 Pandemic
The relationship between the environment and pan-
demics is an important one, that needs to be properly 
established before delving into its implications for the 
dynamics of  the opposing views of  populism and En-
vironmental Law.
Von Schirnding et al20 summarize the fundamental 
linkage between the environment and health by positing 
that “[e]nvironmental factors are increasingly responsi-
ble for ill-health in many parts of  the world. This is 
particularly true in the Global South and among poor 
and vulnerable groups, who are most at risk of  expo-
sure to environmental hazards associated with poverty, 
industrialization, and rapid urbanization”. In this con-
text, the authors also highlight that diseases are increa-
singly transnational, and that, given States’ inability to 
address health threats within their borders, these need 
to be addressed by international law, as “[q]uestions of  
health and the environment have become serious global 
concerns requiring increased international legal coope-
ration”. 
A pandemic is defined as “an epidemic occurring 
worldwide, or over a very wide area, crossing interna-
tional boundaries and usually affecting a large number 
of  people”.21 Zoonotic outbreaks such as that of  CO-
VID-19 are highly influenced by inadequate management 
of  human resources. In this sense, Morse posits that
[e]cological changes, including those due to 
agricultural or economic development, are 
among the most frequently identified factors in 
emergence. They are especially frequent as factors 
in outbreaks of  previously unrecognized diseases 
with high case fatality rates, which often turn out 
to be zoonotic introductions. Ecological factors 
usually precipitate emergence by placing people 
in contact with a natural reservoir or host for an 
20 Yasmin Von Schirnding, William Onzivu, and Andronico O. 
Adede. International environmental law and global public health. 
In: Bulletin of  the World Health Organization 2002, 80 (12), 970-4.
21 J LAST, John M. (ed.). A dictionary of  epidemiology. Oxford: Ox-





































































infection hitherto unfamiliar but usually already 
present (often a zoonotic or arthropod-borne 
infection), either by increasing proximity or, often, 
also by changing conditions so as to favor an 
increased population of  the microbe or its natural 
host (2,4). The emergence of  Lyme disease in 
the United States and Europe was probably due 
largely to reforestation (14), which increased the 
population of  deer and the deer tick, the vector of  
Lyme disease. The movement of  people into these 
areas placed a larger population in close proximity 
to the vector. 22
Furthermore, human behavior influences the like-
lihood of  outbreaks in two main aspects: inadequate 
management of  natural resources, such as inordinate 
changes in land use, and shifts in the patterns of  occu-
pation of  space and of  movement of  people and goods, 
e.g. those caused by increased global travel and urbani-
zation. In this sense, Morse23 highlights, with regard to 
environmental causes of  infectious diseases, that “[b]
ecause humans are important agents of  ecological and 
environmental change, many of  these factors are an-
thropogenic”.
Similarly, Jones et al24 argue that “[e]merging infec-
22 MORSE, Stephen S.. Factors in the Emergence of  Infectious 
Diseases, Emerging Infectious Diseases, Atlanta, v. 1, n. 1, p. 7-15, Jan.-
Mar. 1995.
23 Ibid.
24 “Emerging infectious diseases (EIDs) are a significant burden 
on global economies and public health. Their emergence is thought 
to be driven largely by socio-economic, environmental and ecologi-
cal factors, but no comparative study has explicitly analysed these 
linkages to understand global temporal and spatial patterns of  EIDs. 
Here we analyse a database of  335 EID ‘events’ (origins of  EIDs) 
between 1940 and 2004, and demonstrate non-random global pat-
terns. (…) Furthermore, 71.8% of  these zoonotic EID events were 
caused by pathogens with a wildlife origin—for example, the emer-
gence of  Nipah virus in Perak, Malaysia and SARS in Guangdong 
Province, China. The number of  EID events caused by pathogens 
originating in wildlife has increased significantly with time, control-
ling for reporting effort (GLMP,JID F = 60.7, P < 0.001, d.f. = 57), 
and they constituted 52.0% of  EID events in the most recent dec-
ade (1990–2000) (Fig. 1). This supports the suggestion that zoonotic 
EIDs represent an increasing and very significant threat to global 
health. It also highlights the importance of  understanding the fac-
tors that increase contact between wildlife and humans in develop-
ing predictive approaches to disease emergence. Vector-borne dis-
eases are responsible for 22.8% of  EID events in our database, and 
28.8% in the last decade (Fig. 1). Our analysis reveals a significant 
rise in the number of  EID events they have caused over time, con-
trolling for reporting effort (GLMP,JID F = 49.8, P < 0.001, d.f. = 
57). This rise corresponds to climate anomalies occurring during the 
1990s, adding support to hypotheses that climate change may drive 
the emergence of  diseases that have vectors sensitive to changes in 
environmental conditions such as rainfall, temperature and severe 
weather events. However, this controversial issue requires further 
analyses to test causal relationships between EID events and climate 
tious diseases (EIDs) are a significant burden on global 
economies and public health”, and that “[t]heir emer-
gence is thought to be driven largely by socio-econo-
mic, environmental and ecological factors”. Among 
said environmental factors, climate change deserves to 
be singled out, not only because of  the scale of  its im-
plications, but also because it has a “pandemic” nature 
of  sorts: it is a silent and somewhat intangible threat to 
life on the planet that, despite its potential to affect the 
Global South first and more severely, should leave no 
single nation unscathed.
In addressing the relationship between the environ-
ment and infectious outbreaks, Morse25 emphasizes that 
“[a]gricultural development, one of  the most common 
ways in which people alter and interpose themselves 
into the environment, is often a factor.” The Intergo-
vernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Special 
Report on Climate Change and Land Use, released in 
201926, states that human use directly affects more than 
70 percent of  the global, ice-free land surface, and that 
between a quarter and one-third of  all land is utilized 
for food and energy production, which amounts to a 46 
percent deforestation rate. 
The report also states that the impacts are recipro-
cal: land use contributes to climate change and climate 
change affects land use. Degraded land becomes less 
productive, restricting the types of  crops that can be 
grown, thus reducing the soil’s ability to absorb carbon. 
This exacerbates climate change, which in turn triggers 
land degradation in several significant ways.
The World Health Organization COP24 Special re-
port on Health & Climate Change27, released in 2018 
change”. JONES, Kate E., PATEL, Nikkita G., LEVY, Marc A., 
STOREYGARD, Adam, BALK, Deborah, GITTLEMAN, John L., 
and DASZAK, Peter. Global trends in emerging infectious diseases. 
Nature, London, v. 451(7181), p. 990-3, 2008.
25 Op. cit., 9.
26 INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE 
CHANGE. Special Report on Climate Change and Land, 2019.
27 “Climate change can affect human health directly and indirectly. 
The direct health impacts include physiological effects of  exposure 
to higher temperatures, increasing incidences of  NCDs such as res-
piratory and cardiovascular disease and injuries and death due to 
extreme weather events such as droughts, floods, heatwaves, storms 
and wildfires. Climate change has indirect effects on health due to 
ecological changes, such as food and water insecurity and the spread 
of  climate-sensitive infectious diseases, and also to societal respons-
es to climate change, such as population displacement and reduced 
access to health services. As indirect effects of  climate change may 
result from long causal pathways, they are particularly difficult to 





































































in order to support the negotiations of  the United Na-
tions Framework Convention on Climate Change (UN-
FCCC), explores the interconnection between climate 
change and health. Its findings include evidence that 
climate change can affect human health both directly 
and indirectly in a myriad of  ways, ranging from food 
insecurity28 to mental health issues. With regard to in-
fectious diseases, the report acknowledges that “[th]e 
capacity of  disease vectors to spread infectious diseases 
is increasing as a result of  climatic shifts”.
Morse29 also identifies that “[h]uman population 
movements or upheavals, caused by migration or war, 
are often important factors in disease emergence”. Mi-
gration and war are, in turn, increasingly caused by cli-
mate change. Indeed, the World Meteorological Orga-
nization30 reports that out of  the 17.7 million Internally 
Displaced Persons tracked by the International Organi-
zation for Migration, over 2 million people, as of  Sep-
direct, sometimes with life-long consequences for health and well-
being. For example, NCDs such as mental illness after extreme 
weather events, climate-related displacement, immigration and loss 
of  culture can be lifelong. The capacity of  disease vectors to spread 
infectious diseases is increasing as a result of  climatic shifts; for ex-
ample, the vectorial capacity of  the mosquitoes that are primarily 
responsible for the transmission of  dengue fever has risen by ap-
proximately 10% since the 1950s. Ecological shifts as a result of  
climate changes may have further health effects, by affecting water 
and sanitation and causing food insecurity and malnutrition. Mal-
nutrition is anticipated to be one of  the greatest threats to health 
resulting from climate change, and the young and the elderly will 
be particularly affected. Climate variation and extremes are among 
the leading causes of  severe food crises, and the cumulative effect is 
undermining all dimensions of  food security, including availability, 
access, use and stability. Rising temperatures, floods and droughts 
also affect food safety; for example, rising temps can increase the 
levels of  pathogens in food sources (such as ciguatera in fish) and in 
food, and flooding increases the risk that pathogens will spread from 
livestock”. WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION. COP24 Special 
Report on Health & Climate Change, 2018, p. 20.
28 See also FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION. 
The State of  Food Security & Nutrition around the World, 2018: “Food 
security: Exposure of  the agriculture sector to climate extremes 
is threatening to reverse gains made in ending malnutrition. New 
evidence shows a continuing rise in world hunger after a prolonged 
decline, according to data compiled by United Nations agencies 
including the Food and Agriculture Organization and World Food 
Programme. In 2017, the number of  undernourished people was 
estimated to have increased to 821 million, partly due to severe 
droughts associated with the strong El Niño of  2015–2016”.
29 Op. cit., 11.
30 “According to UNHCR’s Protection and Return Monitoring 
Network, some 883 000 new internal displacements were recorded 
between January and December 2018, of  which 32% were associ-
ated with flooding and 29% with drought”. World Meteorological 
Organization. WMO Statement on the State of  the Global Climate 
in 2018, 32. 
tember 2018, were displaced due to disasters linked to 
weather and climate events. 
Climate change also intensifies migratory move-
ments and conflict over scarce natural resources.31 Mach 
et al32 found that intensifying climate change will increa-
se the risk of  violent conflict. It estimates that climate 
has influenced between 3% and 20% of  armed conflict 
risk over the last century, and that these figures are likely 
to increase significantly. Both of  these phenomena – 
migrations and war –  affect the Global South dispro-
portionately, imposing a heavy toll on vulnerable popu-
lations. The large masses of  people displaced - often 
in subhuman conditions -, in South-South migratory 
waves triggered by the conflics in Syria, the Democratic 
Republic of  Congo, Bangladesh and Yemen are pun-
gent examples of  this assertion, and so are the rise in 
conflicts over the shrinking Lake Chad, a life source for 
neighboring populations in Chad, Niger, Nigeria, and 
Cameroon, and the growing threat of  submersion of  
small island countries caused by climate-change induced 
sea level rise.33 
There are, in sum, important reciprocal implications 
among the environment, climate change, public health, 
food security, migrations, armed conflict, and pande-
mics. Environmental Law must be prepared to deal with 
this state of  interconnectedness. The peculiarities of  its 
object, that is, the nature of  the issues that it investigates 
- diffuse or collective, cross-border, and directly linked 
to the understanding of  the environment in its physical 
dimension - creates the need for a transversal approach 
31 Extensive environmental damages are also committed in the 
course of  armed conflict. An open letter signed by 24 scholars 
urges international lawmakers to adopt a fifth Geneva convention 
that recognizes damage to nature alongside other war crimes, so as 
to provide legal instruments for protection of  crucial natural re-
sources. DURANT, Sarah M., BRITO, José A. et al. Stop military 
conflicts from trashing environment. Nature, London,  v. 571, p. 478, 
Jul. 2019.
32 MACH, Katharine J., KRAAN, Caroline M., ADGER, W. Neil 
et al. Climate as a risk factor for armed conflict. Nature, London, v. 
571, p. 193-7, 2019.
33 “As global climate change is affecting already not only the sea 
level rise, but also is responsible for flooding, droughts and recur-
rent extreme weather, being pain- fully visible especially in the Pa-
cific Ring or Fire. All of  this will make coastal areas (literally almost 
100% of  the PICT territories) gradually uninhabitable, leading to 
submersion of  urban centres, migrations of  displaced people, be-
coming now called as “ecological refugees”, and finally economic 
and political upheaval.” SIEKIERA, Joanna. Implementation of  le-
gal mechanisms of  environmental protection by the South Pacific 
regional organizations. Revista de Direito Internacional/Brazilian Journal 





































































not only with other subjects within the law but also, and 
mainly, with other sciences. Environmental law interacts 
intensively with various areas of  knowledge.
An interdisciplinary approach is one that analyzes, 
synthesizes and harmonizes points of  contact between 
various sciences into a coherent whole. In the domain 
of  the law, interdisciplinarity can materialize through 
the creation of  themes designed collaboratively by se-
veral areas involved and replacing the uncoordinated 
study of  the parts related to each subject. But that is 
not all - Environmental Law constitutes particular-
ly fertile ground for the application of  the notion of  
transdisciplinarity proposed by Piaget34, corresponding 
to a global integration of  all sciences, that is, to what 
it is between disciplines and beyond subjects. When it 
comes to global environmental governance, this pers-
pective may materialize in that it may be insufficient to 
consider the specific inflows of, e.g., international law, 
environmental law, political science, international rela-
tions, sociology, epidemiology, and that it may be ne-
cessary to integrate these domains in a field of  research 
that does not fall properly within any of  them. In short, 
research, education, and practice of  environmental law 
cannot do without a multiple disciplinary approach, 
either through aggregation (multidisciplinarity), cross-
-interactions (interdisciplinarity), holistic interactions 
(transdisciplinarity), or a continuum therebetween. Al-
though this process is not new, it will presumably be 
intensified in the post-pandemic world order, in which 
the production of  knowledge will have to grapple with 
fundamental shifts in our world view, from geopolitics 
to global governance.
Also noteworthy is the fact that the world has come 
to the realization that, while it is true that the Global 
South is hit the hardest by a pandemic due to more 
fragile economies and already burdened public health 
systems, the COVID-19 pandemic is unprecedented in 
the sense that it affects the Global South and North, de-
mocracies and autocracies, and all socioeconomic strata 
across the board. The next section discusses how this 
realization might play out in the post-pandemic world 
order, considering in particular the implications for the 
tension between environmental law and populism.
34 PIAGET, Jean. L’épistémologie des relations interdisciplinaires, 
L’interdisciplinarité: Problèmes d’enseignement et de recherche dans 
les universités, Paris, Broché, 1972.
5  The Future of Environmental Law 
and Governance in a Post-Pandemic 
World
To help ensure its continued development, it is es-
sential to reflect upon the future of  environmental law 
in the post-pandemic world order. To this end, this stu-
dy considers that a few scenarios, described below, are 
possible and worthy of  consideration, especially as a 
means of  giving policymakers’ leeway to anticipate the-
se trends and shape their actions accordingly. 
On the one hand, there is abundant scientific eviden-
ce, discussed in the previous section, in the sense that 
the world’s ability to prevent and adequately respond 
to future outbreaks hinges essentially on the adequate 
management of  natural resources, and that increased 
global cooperation is needed in order achieve this goal.
On the other hand, populism has a well-documen-
ted track record of  overlooking environmental gover-
nance and compliance, or, rather, of  shunning the mat-
ter intently, as a means to ensure that their constituents 
are free from environmental constraints. This fits the 
general populist discourse in the sense that the people 
should regain control, that bureaucrats are not to be 
trusted, and that science is a hermetic domain, inacces-
sible to the layperson. In the economic recession likely 
to be entailed by the pandemic, it is plausible that this 
discourse might gain traction among constituents who 
are too invested in their own survival to entertain en-
vironmental concerns. Indeed, both the Global North 
and the South have witnessed a rollback of  environ-
mental policies amidst the pandemic by governments, 
namely those of  the United States of  America35 and 
Brazil36, that rose to power by appealing to groups – 
such as Corn Belt and Rust Belt workers in the first 
case, and social conservatives in the second – that felt 
overlooked in the democratic process. 
Another salient effect of  the pandemic, potentially 
reinforcing populism and hindering environmental law, 
is what this study chooses to call the reflux of  globaliza-
35 SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN. Rolling Back Environmental Protections 
under Cover of  the Pandemic. Available at: https://www.scientificameri-
can.com/article/rolling-back-environmental-protections-under-
cover-of-the-pandemic/. Access on: 17 Sep. 2020.
36 THE GUARDIAN. Brazil scales back environmental enforcement amid 
coronavirus outbreak. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/
world/2020/mar/27/brazil-scales-back-environmental-enforce-





































































tion, that is, the closing of  borders and restrictions on 
the movement of  persons and goods – something that 
Kissinger, in a recent op-ed for the Wall Street Journal, 
calls “an anachronism, a revival of  the walled city in an 
age when prosperity depends on global trade and mo-
vement of  people”37. Even if  done for epidemiological 
reasons, it entails the dangers of  reinforcing nationalist 
tribalism and of  restricting civil liberties as a new nor-
mal. 
Also significantly, this process could cast a shadow 
on multilateralism.38 Already strained by an overabun-
dance of  treaties39 and deadlocks in environmental and 
climate negotiations, it remains nonetheless the quin-
tessential arena in which environmental governance 
unfolds. Environmental matters are seldom insulated, 
and can only be adequately tacked by multilevel gover-
nance “according to intended levels (e.g., local, regional, 
global), domains (national, international, transnational), 
modes (market, network, hierarchy), and scales (global 
regimes to local community groups)”.40
37 “Third, safeguard the principles of  the liberal world order. The 
founding legend of  modern government is a walled city protected 
by powerful rulers, sometimes despotic, other times benevolent, 
yet always strong enough to protect the people from an external 
enemy. Enlightenment thinkers reframed this concept, arguing that 
the purpose of  the legitimate state is to provide for the fundamen-
tal needs of  the people: security, order, economic well-being, and 
justice. Individuals cannot secure these things on their own. The 
pandemic has prompted an anachronism, a revival of  the walled city 
in an age when prosperity depends on global trade and movement 
of  people. The world’s democracies need to defend and sustain their 
Enlightenment values. A global retreat from balancing power with 
legitimacy will cause the social contract to disintegrate both domes-
tically and internationally. Yet this millennial issue of  legitimacy and 
power cannot be settled simultaneously with the effort to overcome 
the Covid-19 plague. Restraint is necessary on all sides - in both 
domestic politics and international diplomacy. Priorities must be es-
tablished”. KISSINGER, Henry. The Coronavirus Pandemic Will 
Forever Alter the World Order, Wall Street Journal, New York, Apr. 
15, 2020.
38 LEHMEN, Alessandra and BORGES, Caio. Climate Fund Case: 
Climate Litigation reaches the Brazilian Supreme Court, Oxford Hu-
man Rights Hub. Available at:  <https://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/climate-
fund-case-climate-litigation-reaches-the-brazilian-supreme-court/> 
Access on: 20 Sep. 2020.
39 Op. cit..
40 “The same phenomenon occurred with the classic sources of  
international environmental law: the phenomenon of  treaty con-
gestion and the recent stalemates in negotiations of  environmen-
tal treaties, namely in the climate change domain, have resulted in 
a multilateralism crisis”. LEHMEN, Alessandra. The Case for the 
Creation of  an International Environmental Court: Non-State Ac-
tors and International Environmental Dispute Resolution. Colo. Nat. 
Resources, Energy & Envtl. L. Rev., Boulder, v. 26 n. 2, p. 179-217, 
2015.   See also BROWN WEISS, Edith. New Directions in Inter-
It is interesting to observe that there is no clear-cut 
divide, in terms of  success in the response to the pande-
mic, between democracies and autocracies. Elaborating 
on that fact, Fukuyama41 argues that “[w]hat matters in 
the end is not regime type, but whether citizens trust 
their leaders, and whether those leaders preside over a 
competent and effective state”. However, the fact that it 
is difficult to envision the replication of  the unpreceden-
tedly severe Chinese measures in a democracy should 
not be downplayed. Cultural features aside, the level of  
success attained by different countries raises the pressing 
question – or, rather, revives the question asked in the 
wake of  the 9/11 attacks – of  how far can a surveillan-
ce State go, and of  what portion of  their civil liberties 
citizens are willing to relinquish, in an emergency and 
beyond. Furthermore, whether the Western “brand” will 
be tarnished by its response to the pandemic – and, with 
it, its core values of  democracy, pluralism, and freedom 
– still remain to be seen as of  this writing, in April 2020, 
but is a relevant issue to keep track of. 
In the post-pandemic order, whether the systole – 
the contraction represented by nationalist views - of  
national Environmental Law. International Law as a Language for In-
ternational Relations: Proceedings of  the United Nations Congress on Public 
International Law, New York, March 13-17, 1995, U.N. Sales T. 96. 
v. 4, p. 273-75, 1996: “The number and variety of  environmental 
agreements has reached the point that some critics ask whether they 
may not severely strain the physical and organizational capacity of  
countries to handle them. There are signs of  treaty congestion, in 
the form of  separate negotiating forums, separate secretariats and 
funding mechanisms, overlapping provisions or inconsistencies 
between agreements and severe demands on local capacity to par-
ticipate in negotiations, meetings of  parties and associated activi-
ties. This affects the international community as a whole, since there 
will always be limited resources to address difficult issues and some 
countries may suffer particular inequities in their ability to partici-
pate effectively in new regimes (...) [w]ith such a large number of  
international agreements, there is great potential for overlapping 
provisions in agreements, inconsistencies in obligations, significant 
gaps in coverage, and duplication of  goals and responsibilities (...) 
International environmental law has developed in a piecemeal, al-
most random, manner (...) Treaty congestion also contributes to 
significant inefficiencies in implementing international agreements. 
There are usually separate secretariats, monitoring processes, scien-
tific councils, financing mechanisms, technical assistance programs 
and dispute resolution procedures (...) Finally, treaty congestion 
leads to overload at the national level in negotiating and implement-
ing the agreements (...) Even industrialised [s]tates with well-devel-
oped regulatory mechanisms and bureaucracies show signs of  being 
overwhelmed. As attention shifts to the need to comply with exist-
ing agreements, the burden on the administrative capacity of  [s]tates 
will become more acute”. 
41 FUKUYAMA, Francis. The Thing That Determines a Coun-






































































populism or the diastole – the expansion beyond natio-
nal borders and interests – of  global cooperation will 
prevail is also a matter of  which discourse will reso-
nate more sucessfully. Institutions and science matter 
immensely, but it is their task to make themselves heard 
not only by peers but by a larger audience, outside the 
walls of  international organizations and academia, in 
order to be able to counter the antipluralist designs of  
populist politics. Effective communication is an impor-
tant piece of  this puzzle.
A caveat seems, however, to be in order: while scien-
ce generally negates the tenets of  populism, the con-
tention that it at times appropriates populist methods 
is not to be taken lightly. The possibility that science, 
by evolving, may contradict or invalidate prior science, 
is essential to the scientific method, and should not be 
precluded by the need to communicate. For example, 
Fisher, citing Latour42, refers to “the ‘epistemological 
delirium’ which is climate change denial” as one of  the 
manifestations of  populist politics concerning the envi-
ronment. Although the validity of  the body of  climate 
science should not be denied - to the contrary, it is very 
much needed, including, from a communications stan-
dpoint, to counter denialism -, it is noticeable that their 
conclusions are often taken as a given, which could ul-
timately hinder its evolution much in the same way that 
populism reductionism would. As Hilson43 points out, 
“[t]he science there is more sacrosanct; there is a fear of  
epistemological questioning of  the relevant knowledge 
for fear of  lapsing into climate denialism”.
Furthermore, to communicate effectively, scientists 
and policymakers must grasp the limitations of  hard 
science in terms of  generating behavioral change. Even 
if  science may be able to gradually generate a shift in 
public awareness towards environmental and health is-
sues, awareness alone does not necessarily entail change. 
42 FUKUYAMA, Francis. The Thing That Determines a Coun-
try’s Resistance to the Coronavirus. The Atlantic, Washington, 30 
Mar. 2020.
43 “[I]n a recent article, I made a start by exploring the extent to 
which climate change litigation might be regarded as an example 
of  populism—both in terms of  the type of  litigant (with the EU 
‘People’s Climate Case’ perhaps the most obvious example) and the 
style of  argument (eg the populist, autobiographical narrative style 
of  the witness submissions in Juliana). I labelled these ‘populist le-
galism’ and ‘legal populism’, respectively. HILSON, Chris. Climate 
Populism, Courts, and Science, Journal of  Environmental Law, Oxford, 
v. 31, n. 2, p. 1-4, 2019. 
Studies44 have shown a contradiction between cli-
mate change risk perception and policy preferences, 
or, to put it differently, a gap between concern and wi-
llingness to take action in the environmental domain. 
One obvious driver of  this phenomenon is economic 
in nature: in survival mode, the environment becomes 
an afterthought. This holds especially true in times of  
recession. It is, therefore, intuitive that a larger contin-
gent of  people may be attracted to populist antienviron-
mental policies in the aftermath of  the pandemic, and 
even as it unfolds. This is an assumption that needs to 
be seriously taken into consideration in the framework 
of  post-pandemic environmental governance. Indeed, 
policymakers and economic actors worldwide have star-
ted to press45 for the implementation of  a Green New 
Deal, or, generally, to advocate that environmental and 
climate measures should be expressly factored into any 
economic stimulus packages designed to deal with the 
COVID-19 recession, in order to “build back better”46 
by means of  a green restart in the post-pandemic. Con-
versely, however, similar initiatives have been put aside 
under the assumption that they are secondary to the 
more pressing issue of  passing an economic relief  pa-
ckage.47
Another possible cause of  dissonance between awa-
reness and action is that, concerns of  intergenerational 
equity aside, the public does recognize the magnitude 
of  the environmental and public health problems, but 
unconsciously dismisses the policies to address them 
because they are, as mentioned above, too indirect. As 
a result, people do not necessarily perceive the adverse 
effects of, e.g., climate change, as pressing enough to 
44 E.g. LEISEROWITZ, Anthony. Climate Change Risk Percep-
tion and Policy Preferences: The Role of  Affect, Imagery, and Val-
ues, Climatic Change, Cham, v.77, n. 1-2, p. 45-72, 2016, and KOLL-
MUSS, Anja and AGYEMAN, Julian, Mind the gap: why do people 
act environmentally and what are the barriers to pro-environmental 
behavior? Environmental education research, Abington-on-Thames, v. 8, 
n. 3, p. 37-41, 2002. 
45 CLIMATE CHANGE NEWS. Governments have ‘historic opportu-
nity’ to accelerate clean energy transition, IEA says, 17 Mar.  2020. Available 
at: https://www.climatechangenews.com/2020/03/17/govern-
ments-historic-opportunity-accelerate-clean-energy-transition-iea-
says/. Access on: 10 Apr. 2020.
46 THE LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND POLIT-
ICAL SCIENCE. Build Back Better: The five key areas for a post-
pandemic recovery. Available at: https://www.lse.ac.uk/News/
Latest-news-from-LSE/2020/g-July-20/Build-Back-Better-The-
five-key-areas-for-a-post-pandemic-recovery. Access on: 17 Sep 
2020.
47 THE WASHINGTON TIMES. ‘It’s about COVID’: Nancy Pelo-





































































affect them in their life span. Be it out of  selfishness 
(a “why bother?” attitude towards something that one 
does not perceive as affecting them directly) or helples-
sness (a sense that facts likely to occur after one’s death 
are outside one’s locus of  control), a sense of  impen-
ding human finitude and mortality can arguably be a 
relevant factor underlying the abovementioned contra-
diction. This leads to the following hypothesis: one’s no-
tion of  mortality48 may affect willingness to take action 
in the environmental domain, and the extent to which 
people’s worldviews with regard to human finitude can 
affect their risk perception and lead to inaction.49 By 
devising empirical studies in order to understand how 
people shape their reactions to environmental problems 
based on their perceptions of  their stake in the futu-
re, policymakers – and, generally, all those who would 
benefit from a deeper understanding of  public choices 
– may be able to tailor more effective policy commu-
nications directed at groups of  people who are either 
48 “[T]he heaviest weight is indeed the fact that we cannot live our 
lives over again, but instead must find a way to make the most of  the 
life we have. It is the concrete fact of  human mortality that forces 
us to respond to Nietzsche’s demon, or to lapse into an acceptance 
of  our own mediocrity. The ‘heaviest weight’ is the gravity of  our 
own shortcomings super-positioned over the background noise of  
our ticking biological clock”. MARRONE, Stephen S. The Heavi-
est Weight: The Influence of  Human Finitude and Mortality in Nietzsche. 
Available at: https://www.academia.edu/1814399/The_Heaviest_
Weight_The_Influence_of_Human_Finitude_and_Mortality_In_
Nietzsche. Access on: 10.Dec 2019.
49 To answer these questions, we have devised, during a course 
at the Stanford School of  Earth Sciences, in the Spring quarter of  
2014, a survey to be directed at people from 21 to 70 years of  age. 
Participants would be asked until what age they expect to live, and 
will then be presented with a series of  consequences of  climate 
change (e.g. drastic change in temperature, loss of  biodiversity, loss 
of  agricultural land, ocean rise, polar melting) and be asked to rate 
their concern on each topic. Subsequently, they would be presented 
with scenarios stating that these consequences are likely to hap-
pen in 1, 5, 10, 20, 30, 50, and 100 years, and asked to rate their 
willingness to take action to mitigate each problem. Actions would 
be described as ranging from less demanding, such as recycling, to 
progressively more demanding, such as adjusting air conditioning 
temperature, changing consumption and leisure habits, paying extra 
for renewable energy, and paying a carbon tax. The results would 
then be measured to verify if  a) concern and b) willingness to take 
action vary depending on whether respondents believe they will 
still be alive to witness a particular adverse consequence of  climate 
change. As a secondary line of  investigation, the survey would also 
ask a) whether respondents have or plan to have children, as a means 
of  verifying concerns of  intergenerational equity (that is, increased 
willingness to take action not for oneself, but for close ones who will 
outlive the respondent), and b) respondents’ religious affiliation, as a 
means of  verifying if  religious worldviews with regard to continuity 
(reincarnation, second coming, absence of  life after death) can af-
fect respondents’ willingness to take action.
devoid of  intergenerational concerns or skeptical about 
if, and how, these problems could directly affect them 
in their life span. 
In any event, it is clear that most environmental 
threats cannot be experienced firsthand, and are the-
refore perceived as too remote, uncertain, or indirect 
to justify action, thus reinforcing the conditions under 
which a populist antienvironmental agenda can flourish. 
The COVID-19 pandemic, however, could be the har-
binger of  a shift in this perception. The threat to survi-
val is now imminent.
Indeed, the dramatic and unprecedented impact of  
COVID-19 has surprised the public and contradicted 
political leaders’ calculations that their respective coun-
tries would weather the pandemic and remain relatively 
unscathed. Environmental and public health matters 
are, as discussed above, significantly intertwined, to the 
point that the mishandling of  natural resources has an 
established causal effect on the emergence of  infectious 
diseases. Climate change, in particular, holds similarities 
to the pandemic in the sense that both know no borders 
or socioeconomic rank, and constitute an invisible, so-
mewhat intangible threat.
In sum, the impacts of  pandemic are sufficiently 
concrete, urgent, and widespread to muster the atten-
tion of  the people, perhaps significantly enough that 
even populist politicians – who claim to rule for the 
people, and the people alone - will no longer be able to 
eschew the environmental agenda and its public health 
implications.
This reflection leads us to the following hypotheses: 
the pandemic might constitute an inflection point to 
amalgamate two polar opposites – environmental law 
and populism – around a common agenda. A wides-
pread health emergence might change public percep-
tion significantly enough to become a driver for a shift 
away from populist denial of  environmental issues. In 
other words, it could be an element to bypass, at least to 
some extent, the inherent antagonism of  environmen-
tal law and populism. In the meantime, environmental 
scholars, lawyers, and policymakers should vigorously 
strive for the enlightenment of  both the public at large 
and their representatives, populist or not, by developing 






































































This article aims at offering a new perspective on the 
relationship between environmental law and populism, 
a theme with important theoretical and practical impli-
cations, but still largely unexplored. Environmental law 
is particularly susceptible to being antagonized by popu-
list politics. This study concludes that the fundamental 
reasons why environmental law and populism may be 
considered polar opposites are manifold, and include the 
following: (1) Environmental law is pluralist, while po-
pulism is essentially antipluralist; (2) Environmental pro-
blems require complex and sustained, long-term action, 
while the populist discourse favors simple and immedia-
te solutions; (3) Environmental law depends on sound 
science and institutions, which are shunned by populism 
as elite experts who are not to be trusted; (4) Environ-
mental law derives its legitimacy from the rule of  law, 
while populism claims to derive theirs directly from the 
people, and sees the rule of  law as an inconvenient cons-
traint; (5) Environmental law unfolds mainly in the mul-
tilateral arena, which populism tends to reject in favor 
of  a nationalistic approach; (6) Multilevel governance of  
the environment requires ample public participation and 
access to information, while populism relies on centrali-
zing information and building official narratives; and (7) 
Environmental law constrains individual activity, while 
the populist discourse typically praises individual free-
dom, represented by the notion that the people should 
“regain control”. Lastly, an indirect impact of  populism 
on the environment – one that falls within a category of  
its own, and to which the Global South is particularly 
susceptible – is that impoverished populations of  coun-
tries under populist rule are generally too focused on 
survival to consider taking environmental action.
These conclusions hold true in the current geopo-
litical configuration. Against the backdrop of  the pro-
foundly altered world that is likely to emerge from the 
COVID-19 coronavirus pandemic, however, some re-
flections are in order. The environment and pandemics 
are inextricably linked, and the public’s risk perception 
with regard to environmental issues, once confronted 
with an actual, concrete threat, is likely to change. Is it 
possible that these changes are intense enough to force 
populist politicians to acknowledge the environmental 
agenda? Or, to the contrary, in a world struggling for 
economic recovery, will the environment be relegated 
to an afterthought? 
Pondering the future of  environmental law in the 
post-pandemic world order is an imperative for poli-
cymakers, so as to anticipate future developments and 
shape actions accordingly. Whether the systole of  po-
pulism or the diastole of  global cooperation will pre-
vail is largely a matter of  which discourse will resonate 
deeper within society. Institutions matter, as does scien-
ce, but environmental policymakers and scientists must 
understand these trends and communicate effectively, 
in order to make themselves heard outside the walls of  
international organizations and academia, and, ultima-
tely, to stand a fighting chance to counter the antiplura-
list, antiliberal, and antidemocratic designs of  populist 
politics. 
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